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Oct. 1969] PEoPLE V. COLEMAN 1159 
[71 C.2d 1159; 80 Cal.Rptr. 920. 459 P.2d 248) 
[Crim. No. 12369. In Bank. Oct. 3, 1969.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OTIS 
RONALD COLE:M:AN, Defendant and Appellant. 
[ Crim. No. 13437. In Bank. Oct. 3, 1969.] 
. In re OTIS RONALD COLEMAN on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Reversible Error-Evidence-Hearsay-Ac-
cusation of Third Persons.-In a murder prosecution, it was 
reversible error to pennit a police officer to testify to a wit-
ness' extrajudicial statement to the ~ffect that defendant had 
asked the witness to assist him in fabricating a slip showing 
the sale of the murder weapon to a codefendant prior to the 
murder, where defendant had deni~d the oceurrence on cross-
examination, where the witness testified that he had never seen 
defendant before the trial but that the offieer had asked him 
to agree that defendant had so approached him, where the 
jury was not -instructed that the prior statement could be 
considered only to impeach the witness' testimony, where,· in 
any event, the probative value of the officer's testimony for 
impeachment purposes was substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission would create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352), and where the officer's 
testimony not only struek at a: key element in defendant's 
case, but could well have been devastating to defendant's 
credibility. 
[2] Id. - Evidence - Hearsay - Declarations of Third Persons -
Witness' Prior Consistent Statements.-In a murder prosecu-
tion, it was error to admit evidence of a codefendant's prior 
consistent statements under Evid .. Code, § 791, where the co-
defendant had pleaded guilty and testified against defendant, 
and where, although defendant's testimony that the codefend-
ant was lying amounted to an implied charge of improper 
motive, there was no showing that the eonsistent statements 
were made before the improper motive arose. 
[1] Extrajudicial statements by witness who is subject to cross-
examination as evidence of facts to which they relate, note, 133 
A.L.R. 1454. See also, Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidence, § 515; Am. 
Jur.2d, Evidence, § 500. . 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidenee, § 516. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1382.1 (18); [2] Crim-
inal Law, §429(0.5); [3] Criminal Law, §628(6); [4] Criminal 
Law, § 1011(4); [5] Criminal Law, § 1011(6); [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1011(3); [7] Criminal Law, §§ 1011(3),1011(4). 
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[3] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Comment on Lack of Testimony- . 
Failure of Defendant's Wife to Testify.-In a murder prose-
cution, it was not misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to 
comment on the failure of defendant's wife to testify on his 
behalf, where no question of privilege was involved (Evid. 
Code, §§ 911, 970, 971), and where the wif~ was a material and 
important witness to defendant's case. 
[4] Id.-Judgment and Sentenc~Determination of Punishment-
Evidenc~Potentia.l for Rehabilitation.-On the penalty phase 
of a capital case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in 'refusing to allow the pastor of the church defendant at-
tended while he was a teenager to testify as to his opinion of 
defendant's potential for rehabilitation, where defendant had 
not been a member of the witness' congregation for over 10 
years before the trial. 
[6] Id.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of Punishment-
Evidence-As to Prior Acts.-On the penalty phase of a capi-
tal ease, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that 
defendant had engaged in fist fights and in failing to instruct 
that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
fights occurred before they could consider them; such evidence 
was admissible as part of deferidant's background, and a rf>a-
sonable doubt instruction with respect thereto was not re-
quired, where the trial court instructed the jury that such 
evidence was not evidence of any specific crime or crimes. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of Punish-
ment-Argument During Penalty Pha.se.-On the .penalty phase 
of a capital ease, it was misconduct for the prosecuting at-
torney to argue that defendant's refusal to admit his guilt 
demonstrated his lack of remorse; even after having been 
found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to confess, 
and he has a right to urge his possible innocence to the jury 
as a factor in mitigation of penalty. 
[7] Id. - Judgment and Sentence - Determination of Penalty-
Argument: Evidence.-On the penalty phase of a capital ease, 
the jury may properly consider defendant's remorSe or lack 
thereof in fixing the penalty; evidence on that issue is admis-
sible; and counsel may comment thereon. 
APPEAL, automatica.lly taken under Penal Code, section 
1239, subdivision (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Alameda County. Leonard Dieden, Judge, and PRO-
CEEDING in habeas corpus challenging a judgment on the 
verdict. Judgment reversed; writ denied. 
[3J See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 436. 
) 
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree murder with the penalty fixed at death reversed. 
Gerald Z. Marer, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, Keogh & Marer and Keogh & Lundgren for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci, 
John T. Murphy and Horace Wheatley, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent., 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the 
first degree murder of Vincent Sulezich and fixed the penalty 
at death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial or to 
reduce the penalty to life imprisonment and entered judgment 
on the verdict. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b).) 'Ve also have oofore us a petition for haooas cor-
pus challenging the judgment. 
Vincent Sulezich operated a cocktail bar in Newark, Cal-
. ifornia. He borrowed money every week from a bank to cash 
. paychecks of his customers, and it was "common gossip" 
that he carried large amounts of money on his person. He was 
fatally shot and robbed when he returned to his home in 
Oakland after work about 3 :30 a.m. on Sunday, November 20, 
1966. A witness who was in a nearby apartment heard the 
gunshots, went to the window, and saw two persons run to a 
car in the street and drive off. . 
In February 1967, more than two months after the crime 
was committed, James Stevenson went to the Oakland police 
station and confessed to being one' of the participants. He 
named defendant as the other. He pleaded guilty to first de-
gree murder and was sentenced to prison for life. Thereafter 
he'testified against defendant at defendant's trial. 
Stevenson testified that he had known defendant for from 
six to eight weeks before the crime was committed and that he 
had been with him many times in bars in the Newark area. 
They discussed the gossip that Mr. Sulezich carried large 
sums of money and developed a plan to rob him when he 
returned home from work. Their first attempt failed, and they 
returned the next night when the crime was committed. They 
went in Stevenson's car. 
Stevenson testified that he did not have a weapon and did 
not know that defendant had a gun until they. parked near 
the Sulezich home to wait for Mr. Sulezich to return. When 
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they got out of the car Stevenson saw that defendant had a 
gun, and defendant said, "don't worry about the gun, it will 
just scare the hen out of him." After waiting under a tree 
for about 45 to 60 minutes, they saw Mr. Sulezich's car ap-
proaching, and defendant ran toward the house while Steven-
son stayed under the tree. Mr. Sulezich drove into the garage, 
got out of his car, and walked back onto the driveway. De-
fendant appeared behind Mr. Sulezich and either knocked or 
pushed him down. Stevenson saw a fiash and heard two shots. 
He began running to his car and after five seconds he heard a 
third shot. Defendant returned to the car and told Stevenson 
to drive away without turning on the headlights. 
Stevenson testified that he and defendant returned to de-
fendant's home where they divided the loot, about $1,100. En 
route defendant had thrown away the gun, a gun clip, bullets, 
and a wallet. They stayed at defendant's home for about two 
hours, and defendant took a shower and changed his' clothes 
because the clothes he had been wearing were bloody. They 
then drove to Niles Canyon and threw the bloody clothes in a 
creek. About 7 a.m. they went to a bar in Newark. Stevenson 
and his wife both testified that later in the morning Steven-
son's wife, who had been looking for him to tell him he could 
not come home, came to the bar and confronted Stevenson. 
Defendant said to her, "now Brenda, don't be mad at Jim. HE 
hasn't done anything wrong. He's been with me all night." 
Later in the day Stevenson' drove defendant to San JOSf 
and thereafter to the San Francisco airport. Defendant fieVi 
to Baltimore and then went to Virginia where he stayed ir 
various places until his arrest in February. There was evi 
dence that he had several hundred dollars while he was iI 
Virginia. 
Police officers found the gun where Stevenson told then 
defendant had abandoned it. There was ballistic evidence tha 
the bullets found at the scene of the crime had been fired fror 
that gun. There was also evidence that defendant bought th 
gun and had it in his possession before the crime was commi1 
ted. 
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied partie 
pating with Stevenson in any way in planning or committin 
the robbery and murder. He testified that he sold' his gun 1 
Stevenson about a week before the crime was committed, an 
that he saw it in the glove compartment of Stevenson's car 
few days earlier. 
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Defendant testified that he first met Stevenson in October 
1966 after defendant lost his job and that he was with Steven-
son from 10 to 15 times, usually at bars, until he left for 
Virginia. A few days before the crime was committed defend-
ant decided to return to Virginia, where he had fonnerlv 
lived, because he was out of work and unable to support his 
family and had heard that if he left home his wife could 
recieve welfare support for herself and the children. Defend-
ant arranged for Stevenson to pick him up on Sunday, No-
vember 20, 1966, the day of the crime. They were to leave 
defendant's home about 8 a.m. and Stevenson was to drive 
him to Highway 101 in San Jose so that defendant could 
hitchhike east. 
Defendant testified that on Saturday evening he was with 
Stevenson, another friend, and his brother-in-law at a bar in 
Newark. About midnight defendant, his brother-in-law, and 
Stevenson went to another bar where defendant and his broth-
er-in-law had a drink. Stevenson stayed outside and met a 
friend whose name defendant· did not remember. Defendant's 
brother-in-law. took him home shortly before 1 a.m., and de-
fendant stayed at home the rest of the night and did not see 
Stevenson again until the next morning. Stevenson arrived 
around 6 or 7 a.m. and took defendant to the bar where later 
in the morning defendant sought to placate Stevenson's wife 
by telling her that he had been with Stevenson all night. 
Thereafter Stevenson drove defendant to San Jose and then 
to the airport and lent him money for plane fare and the trip 
to Virginia. Defendant and a defense witness testified that 
defendant won by gambling the several hundred dollars that he 
had in Virginia. . 
[1] . Defendant. contends that it was prejudicial error to 
admit into evidence a hearsay statement of witness Hood that 
defendant had approached Hood in jail and asked him to 
secure Stevenson's signature on a piece of paper so that de-
fendant could fabricate a sales slip for the murder weapon. 
We agree with this contention. 
Defendant testified that when he sold the murder weapon to 
Stevenson about a week before the crime was committed, he 
did not request or receive a receipt for the sale. On cross-
examination he denied that he ever attempted to procure 
Stevenson's signature for the purpose of making a false re-
ceipt as evidence of the alleged sale of the gun. In rebuttal the 
prosecution called Hood, who had been an inmate in the same 
jail with defendant and Stevenson before defendant's trial. 
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Hood testified that he had never seen defendant before he saw 
him at the trial. Hood also stated that a police officer, Inspector 
Hughes, had tried to get him to agree that defendant had 
asked him to procure Stevenson's signature but that he had 
told Inspector Hughes that no such request was made of him. 
Inspector Hughes was then called and testified over ob-
jection to a conversation that he had with Hood in which 
Hood stated that defendant had asked Hood to secure 
Stevenson's signature on a piece of paper that could be used 
to create a false sales slip for the gun to be predated before 
the Sulezich murder. 
Since Hood's prior statement was used to prove the truth 
of the matter therein asserted, defendant's constitutional right 
to confront the witness against him was violated. (U.S. 
Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; People v. Johnson (1968) 68 
Ca1.2d 646 [68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111] ; People v. Green 
(1969) 70 Ca1.2d 654 [75 Cal.Rptr. 782, 451 P.2d 422] ; Peo-
ple v. Odom (1969) 71 Ca1.2d 709, 713-716 [78 Cal.Rptr. 
873, 456 P .2d 145].) As in Odom, the trial in this case oc-
curred after the effective date of the Evidence Code permitting 
~uch use (Evid. Code, § 1235) and before the decision of this 
rlourt in the Johnson case holding section 1235 unconsti-
tutional as applied against' a defendant in a criminal case. 
The jury was not instructed that the prior statment could be 
considered only to impeach Hood's testimony. Moreover, the 
prosecuting attorney forcefully argued that Hughes' testi-
mony setting forth Hood's statement was evidence that 
Hood's conversation with defendant occurred. 
It must also be noted that the error was not limited to the 
failure to restrict the jury's consideration of Hood's state-
ment to impeachment of Hood's testimony. That statement 
was not admissible at all, for its probative value to impeach 
Hood's testimony was obviously" substantially outweighed by 
the probability that its admission [would] . . . create sub-
stantial danger of undue prejudice." (Evid. Code, § 352.) 
Hood's testimony that he had not seen defendant before he 
saw him at the trial and that defendant had not asked him to 
secure Stevenson's signature detracted not at all from the 
prosecution's case before the jury. At most the prosecution 
was denied advantageous testimony that it may have hoped to 
elicit, even though it knew before it put Hood on the stand 
that he would not testify as the prosecution wished. Accord-
ingly, proof that Hood was a liar was of benefit to the prose-
cution only if the jury were to believe the truth of Hood'8 
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prior statement. The prosecution, however, was not entitled to 
that benefit, and the risk that it might improperly secure that 
benefit by impeaching Hood far outweighed any legitimate 
interest the prosecution had in such impeachment. 
The error in permitting the jury to consider Hood's state-
ment as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein 
was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights and com-
pels reversal, for we are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error was harmless. (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 8.Ct. 824] ; 
People v. Odom, supra, 71 Cal.2d 709, 717.) 
The jury was confronted with a direct conflict between Ste-
venson's testimony and defendant's testimony as to defend-
ant's participation in the crime, and it is impossible to de-
termine how the jury would have resolved that conflict had it 
not had before it inadmissible hearsay evidence that defend-
ant attempted to fabricate a false sales slip to dissociate him-
self from the murder weapon. Not only did the erroneously 
admitted evidence strike at a key element in defendant's case, 
it could well have been devastating to defendant's credibility. 
It is therefore reasonably possible that it contributed to the re-
sult. (Chapman v. Californw, supra, 3$6 U.S. 18,24; Fahy v. 
Cownecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 172-
173, 84 8.Ct. 229] ; see also Harrington v.California (1969) 
395 U.s. 250, 254 [23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287-288, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 
1728].) 
We now turn.to contentions that ~ay arise on retrial. 
[2] Defendant contends tha.t it was error to admit evi-
dence that Stevenson had made statements to his father and 
wife that were consistent with his testimony at ilie trial. 
These statements were made before Stevenson turned himself 
in to the police. They were admitted in evidence in rebuttal 
after Stevenson had testified on. cross-examination that he 
turned himself in, pleaded guilty, and received a life sentence 
and after defendant had testified that he had not been with 
Stevenson at the time of the crime and characterized Steven-
son's testimony implicating defendant as lies. Over objection, 
the trial court admitted the statements under section 791 of 
the Evidence Code, which provides: "Evidence of a state-
ment made by a. witness that is consistent with his testimony 
at the hearing is inadmissible to support his credibility unless 
it is offered after: ... (b) An express or implied charge 
has been made that his testimony at the hearing is recently 
fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, 
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and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fab-
rication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen." 
Although defendant made no charge of recent fabrication 
or bias and no express charge of other improper motive, we 
agree with the Attorney General's contention that defend-
ant's testimony that Stevenson was lying was an implied 
charge that Stevenson had confessed to a lesser role in the 
crime and named defendant as the killer for the improper 
motive of falsely placing the major blame on defendant so 
t.hat Stevenson might not receive the death penalty. To 
establish the admissibility of the prior consistent statements 
under subdivision (b) of section 791, however, it was also 
incumbent on the prosecution' to show that the statements 
were made before the improper motive "is alleged to have 
aris~n. " Since defendant did not expressly allege any im-
proper motive, he did not expressly allege when any such 
!llotive may have arisen. By implication, however, defendant 
alleged that it arose when Stevenson decided to protect him-
self at defendant's expense. There is no reason to believe 
that such improper motive, if any, did not arise before Steven-
son decided to confess his' Involvement in the crime to his 
father and his wife. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with 
defendant's implied charge of improper motive that it arose 
immediately after the murder, when Stevenson realized the 
predicament he was in, or after he had reflected on the likeli-
hood that he would be caught but that perhaps defendant 
would not be, or even before .the murder was committed, if, 
as defendant implied, Stevenson was with another person 
when the crime was committed and knew that defendant 
would be leaving the state on the following day. Accordingly, 
the prosecution did not show that when Stevenson implicated 
defendant in his statements to his father and his wife, the 
alleged improper motive had not already arisen. I t was 
therefore error to admit the prior consistent statements into 
evidence. l 
IPeople v. Duvall (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 417 [68 Ca1.Rptr. 708], is 
not to the contrary. In that case the implied charge of improper motive 
referred to a specific time, namely, when the accomplice-witnesses were 
impliedly charged with making a "deal" with the district attorney. Prior 
consistent statements made before that time were therefore properly ad-
mitted. In the present case, however, there was no implied charge that 
Stevenson's improper motive arose out of a "deal" with the prosecution 
and therefore arose at the time such a "deal" was made. The implica-
tion was that he approached the police with an already concocted story 
that cast himself in the best possible light. 
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[3] Defendant contends that the prosecuting attorney 
committed misconduct by commenting on the failure of de-
fendant's wife to testify on his behalf. 'Ve do not agree with 
this contention. 
Before the enactment of the Evidence Code it was miscon-
duct for the prosecuting attorney to comment on the failure 
of a defendant's spouse to testify for the defendant. (People 
v. Wilkes (1955) 44 Cal.2d 679,687 [284 P.2d 481], and cases 
cited.) At that time, however, neither spouse could testify 
for or against the other without the consent of both. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 1; Pen. Code, § 1322; both repealed 
effective Jan. 1, 1967.) Accordingly, it was improper to 
comment on the defendant's spouse's failure to testify, for 
the defendant could not compel his spouse to testify either 
for or against him. Under the provisions of the Evidence 
Code, however, a defendant's spouse has no privilege not to 
testify for the defendant, and the defendant has no privilege' 
to preven.t his spouse from testifying for or against him. 
(Evid. Code, §§ 911, 970, 971.) Comment on a wife's failure 
to testify for her defendant husband does not, therefore, con-
stitute comment on the exercise of a privilege that defendant 
has (see Evid. Code, § 913) or on his failure to call a witness 
that he cannot compel to testify on his behalf. Since defend-
ant's failure to call his wife was a failure to call a material 
and important witness, his not doing so could be considered 
by the jury and commented upon by the prosecuting attorney. 
(See Evid. Code, § 412; People v. Carter (1953) 116 Cal. 
App.2d 533, 539 [253 P.2d 1016].) 
[4] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of 
penalty, the trial court erred in refusing to allow the pastor 
. of the church defendant attended while he was a teenager 
. to testify as to his opinion of defendant's potential for re-
habilitation. Although the pastor of the defendant's church 
will frequently be qualified to give an opinion with respect to 
the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, it is for the trial 
court to determine whether in a particular case, the pastor's 
opportunities to know and observe the defendant were suffi;. 
cient to provide a basis for a meaningful opinion. In the 
present case, defendant had not been a member of the wit-
ness' congregation for over ten years before the trial. Accord-
ingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow the witness to state his opinion. (See People v. Davis 
(1965) 62 Ca1.2d 791, 801 [44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142].) 
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[5] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of 
penalty, the trial court erred in admitting evidence that 
defendant had engaged in fist fights and in faiJing to instruct 
that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
fights occurred before it could consider them. Evidence that 
defendant engaged in fist fights, however, was admissible as 
part of his background and history (Pen. Code, § 190.1), and 
since the trial court instructed the jury that such evidence 
was "not evidence of any specific crime or crimes," a reason-
able doubt instruction with respect thereto was not required. 
[6&] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of 
penalty, the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by 
arguing that defendant's refusal· to admit his guilt demon-
strated his lack of remorse. The prosecuting attorney stated: 
"There he sits. A murderer. A robber-murderer. Remorse! 
1Vhere is the remorse T ••• A man who, to this very day, 
will not get on that stand aud admit what he has done ..•. 
You are dealing with a cunning individual, a man who 
refuses, up to this very minute I am talking to you now, to 
admit his guilt; . . . a care-less individual." 
[7] The jury may properly consider the defendant's re-
morse or lack thereof in fixing the penalty. Evidence on that 
issue is therefore admissible, and counsel may comment 
thereon. (People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 712 [51 
Cal.Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633].) [6b] It does not- follow, 
however, that every inference bearing on the question of 
remorse may be urged upon the jury by counsel. It is funda-
mentally unfair to urge, as was done here, that a defendant's 
failure to confess his guilt after he has been found guilty 
demonstrates his lack of remorse and that therefore such 
failure should be considered as a ground for· imposing the 
death penalty. Even after he has been found guilty, a defend-
ant is under no obligation to confess, and he has a right to 
urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitiga-
tion of penalty. (People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145-
147 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) A defendant would 
be placed in an intolerable dilemma if his failure to confess 
following conviction could be urged at the trial on the issue 
of penalty as evidence of lack· of remorse. To silence such 
arffument, a defendant who had denied his guilt at the trial 
on the issue of guilt would have to admit or commit perjury 
at the trial on the issue of penalty. and he could do neither 
without in effect forfeiting his right to urge the trial court 
on motion for new trial to reweigh the evidence on the issue 
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of guilt. We conclude that any argument that failure to 
confess should be deemed evidence of lack of remorse is not 
pennissible. 
By petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed while this 
appeal was pending, defendant contends that it was error 
to admit evidence that he had been convicted of burglary 
in Virginia, on the ground that he was denied effective rep-
resentation of counsel in the Virginia proceedings. Since 
defendant did not challenge the validity of his prior convic-
tion at the trial, there is nothing in the record on appeal to 
support defendant's contention. We issued an order to show 
cause in the habeas corpus proceeding, however, so that we 
could determine, if necessary, whether the evidence of the 
prior conviction vitiated the judgment before us on the 
automatic appeal. Since the judgment must be reversed on 
other grounds, the validity of the prior conviction can be 
detennined on retrial in accord with the procedure set forth 
in People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217-218 [60 Cal. 
Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]. Accordingly, our order to show 
cause will be discharged. 
The judgment in Crim. No. 12369 is reversed. 
The order to show cause in Crim. No. 13437 is discharged, 
and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent from that part of the opinion that 
reverses the judgment in Crim. No. 12369, and would affirm 
the judgment. 
I concur with that part of the opinion discharging the 
.order to show cause in Crim. No. 13437 and denying the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
